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Abstract. The effects of natural hazards can be mitigated
by the use of proper “pre-event” interventions on “key” el-
ements of the territory, that is on elements that are mostly
vulnerable to a given catastrophic scenario and whose loss
of functionality can cause damages on people, property and
environment. In this respect, methodologies and tools should
be studied to support decision makers in the analysis of a ter-
ritory, in order to point out such elements. In this work, vul-
nerability is taken into account under two aspects: “physical
vulnerability”, which measures the propensity of a territorial
element to suffer damage when subject to an external stress
corresponding to the occurrence of a natural phenomenon;
“functional vulnerability”, which measures the propensity of
a territorial element to suffer loss in functionality, even when
that is caused by the loss of functionality of other territorial
elements. In the proposed modeling approach, vulnerability
is represented through the use of a graph-based formaliza-
tion. A territorial system is represented as a complex set of
elements or sub-systems. Such elements have differentiated
and dedicated functions, and they may be functionally inter-
connected among them. In addition, vulnerability is defined
through the use of two different variables, namely the criti-
cality and the efficiency. Focusing the attention on the tem-
poral phases corresponding to the occurrence of a calamitous
event, the first one measures the service demand of an ele-
ment, whereas the efficiency is a measure of the service that
can be offered by such an element. The approach presented
is largely independent from the natural risk considered. Be-
sides, the tools introduced for the vulnerability analysis of
the territorial system can also be used to formalize decision
problems relevant to the location of the available resources
for emergency management. A specific case study pertain-
ing to the hydrological risk in the Val di Vara area (Italy) is
presented.
Correspondence to: E. Trasforini
(eva@cima.unige.it)
1 Introduction
It is generally reckoned that prevention activities play a fun-
damental role to mitigate the damages due to environmental
catastrophes. Prevention activities on a territory are mostly
devoted to the reduction of the vulnerability. In this respect,
the terms “hazard” (that is related to the probability of oc-
currence of an extreme event with an estimated – low – fre-
quency) and “risk” (that associates the occurrence probabil-
ity of the extreme event with the losses it would imply) are
world wide used with a common meaning. On the counter-
part, there is much more uncertainty about the significance
of the term “vulnerability” (Bogardi, 2004), and the research
community still lacks a common conceptualization of vul-
nerability (Cutter, 1996). In general, it is felt that the con-
cept of vulnerability, as related to a community living in a
territory, is connected to its exposure and proximity to exter-
nal events (susceptibility) and to its predisposition to suffer
losses when exposed to natural or socially induced physical
events (Lavell, 2000). From an engineering perspective and
with reference to natural hazards, hazard reduction activities
are usually based on studies involving the territorial system
as a whole (for example, in the case of flood risk, example
of such activities might be the construction of protective bar-
riers, the adoption of certain policies in land use manage-
ment, such as reforestation, etc.). On the other hand, vulner-
ability reduction activities are generally more devoted to the
identification of infrastructures and building elements whose
structure enhancement (for example by retrofitting) might ef-
fectively improve the functionality of the element itself even
when exposed to a catastrophic scenario.
Actually, the quantification of the loss of functionality of a
territorial element is a crucial problem, since it depends not
only on its own characteristics (such as, for example, its in-
tegrity after the occurrence of a disastrous event), but also on
the functionality of other elements, whose state may condi-
tion the functionality of the considered element. For exam-
ple, in a certain territory, the impossibility to use a road, due
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to a landslide, can affect the functionality of several other
territorial elements, whose functionality depends on the ac-
cessibility of that road.
The literature concerning risk assessment, for the vari-
ous kinds of natural hazards, is quite copious. For exam-
ple, as regards hydrologic risk one can refer to Siccardi et
al. (2005), Horritt et al. (2002), and Krzysztofowicz (2001),
for landslides hazard assessment one can refer to Varnes
(1984), whereas for forest fire risk to Wybo et al. (1995),
and Fiorucci et al. (2005), for industrial risk to Balducelli et
al. (2000), and for transportation risk to Fabiano et al. (2002),
and Giglio et al. (2004).
In any case, the general goal of a risk assessment proce-
dure is to map the hazard over the considered territorial sys-
tem, and to identify the territorial elements that are exposed
to such a hazard, possibly evaluating the expected loss, for
each element, due to the occurrence of an event compatible
with the considered hazard distribution.
However, as already pointed out, the analysis of what may
happen to any single element may not be sufficient to evalu-
ate the potential impact of a given event over the whole con-
sidered territorial system. In fact, as above mentioned, the
functionality of a territorial element (i.e., the capability to
provide service or to ensure safety to the inhabitants, during
an emergency phase) may be heavily affected by the mutual
functional interconnections among the elements in the con-
sidered territory.
Thus, there is the necessity of developing a comprehensive
approach that allows the analysis of the impact of a potential
extreme event over a certain territorial system, taking into
account both the direct and indirect effects of the event. A
first attempt in this direction has been made in Minciardi et
al. (2005). In this paper, that approach is extended and made
deeper, in order to make it more suitable for application.
Moreover, in this paper, the use of such an approach is
considered as regards the development of a decision support
system (DSS) assisting decision makers, not only in the anal-
ysis of the impact, over a complex territorial system, of a cer-
tain disastrous event, but also in devising suitable strategies
in order to mitigate such an impact.
The territorial system is modeled as a directed graph, in
which nodes represent territorial elements worth to be indi-
vidually considered, whereas links represent conditioning re-
lationships between such elements. A key concept in evalu-
ating the impact of an event over the considered territory is
that of “functional integrity”, or, more simply, “functional-
ity”. By such a term, the capability of a territorial element of
providing service or safety conditions to the interested popu-
lation is generically intended. In the following, more formal
definitions will be provided.
In the next section, the formal representation of a territorial
system will be introduced and a procedure for the vulnerabil-
ity analysis will be discussed. Further, in Sect. 3, a procedure
is presented to formulate a decision (optimization) problem
concerning the mitigation of the vulnerability of the territo-
rial system for a given scenario. Then, in Sect. 4, a case
study is considered, and some final conclusions are drawn in
Sect. 5.
2 Vulnerability analysis of the territorial system
As for other complex systems, a territorial system can be de-
fined as the collection of elements characterized by individ-
ual features, interconnected by mutual causal relationships in
such a way that the dynamic behavior of the state variables
characterizing each element of the set has to be jointly deter-
mined.
In the case of a territorial system, the choice of the ele-
ments to be taken into account is largely dependent on the
kind of hazard considered. The elements worth to be taken
into account may be modeled either as points (e.g., buildings,
industrial settlements, etc.), lines (e.g., roads, or other trans-
port infrastructures), or areas (e.g. municipalities, regions,
territory at risk). In some cases, it is convenient to consider
explicitly a territorial element as made of several intercon-
nected sub-elements.
Considering a specific hazard (hydrogeological, seismic,
wildfire, etc.), the elements to be represented are those that
are presumably involved in a given plausible scenario, both
as possible sources of demand for intervention, and as struc-
tures capable of providing services within an emergency
phase. It is clear that, as the territorial system is made of in-
terconnected elements, damage to one of such elements may
induce a loss in “functionality” for other elements that are not
directly (i.e., physically) involved in the considered event.
An intuitive and effective way to represent the mutual con-
ditioning relationships among the various territorial elements
is that related to the use of influence diagrams (Howard et al.,
1984; Schachter, 1988; Shenoy, 1992). These diagrams can
be used to formalize explicitly the dependences among either
stochastic or deterministic variables describing the state of
the system. Such dependencies can be quantitatively evalu-
ated on the basis of the know-how of experts, and of statistic
information. The nodes in the influence diagram represent
the variables in the system to be modeled, and the directed
links identify conditional influences among them. A variable
x is said to influence a state variable y (and then a directed
link from x to y exists in the influence diagram) if informa-
tion given about x tells something about y.
The modeling approach proposed in this paper (that is an
evolution of the methodology introduced by Minciardi et al.,
2005) does not aim at representing a system with stochastic
components. In addition, the nodes are not associated with
variables, but with elements (or sub-elements) in the terri-
tory. For these reasons, in the following the term “graphs”
will be used instead of “influence diagrams”.
Then, let the territorial system be represented as a directed
graph G(E,F ). Nodes belonging to set E represent the ter-
ritorial elements. Three sub-sets, in general not disjoint, of
set E can be identified:
– the sub-set D of nodes representing elements that, when
subject to an external stress, are affected by physical
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damages, thus requiring some service by other ele-
ments; such elements can be inadequate either to ensure
satisfactory safety levels to people nearby, or to supply
service to other elements belonging to the territorial sys-
tem;
– the sub-set R of nodes representing elements whose
function is to provide the nodes belonging to sub-set D
with the required services; such nodes typically corre-
spond to headquarters of policemen, firemen, civil pro-
tection, etc.;
– the sub-set S of nodes representing infrastructure ele-
ments, which are necessary to allow elements of sub-set
R to provide the elements of sub-set D with the required
services.
A directed link (i, j) is drawn between two nodes of set E,
when the element associated to node i conditions the func-
tionality of the element corresponding to node j . Moreover,
let P (i) be the set of predecessors of node i, i.e., the set of
nodes j such that a directed link (j, i) exists.
Then, let us consider a generic natural hazard of type
h. Note that the graph representing the system, both for
its topological aspects and the quantifications affecting its
links (see below) is in general dependent on the particu-
lar kind of hazard considered. For this kind of hazard, one
can suppose to consider a generic scenario, that is, a vector
ξ=col(ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξN )T , being N the number of the consid-
ered territorial elements, where ξi is the external stress vector
(each component measures a specific physical quantity) that
provides the intensity of the phenomenon, at the location cor-
responding to element i.
The formal representation of the territorial system requires
the introduction of the following (numerical) indicators and
functions for the elements within the considered territorial
system:
yi physical integrity; this is a numerical indicator whose
value belongs to interval [0,1], where 1 corresponds to an
element not affected by the external stresses corresponding
to the considered scenario, and 0 corresponds to an element
completely shattered by those stresses; owing to the defini-
tion of sub-set D, yi=1 for all elements i not belonging to
D;
fi
(
ξ i
)
physical vulnerability function of territorial ele-
ment i; such a function represents the propensity of this ele-
ment to suffer damage when subject to the external stresses
corresponding to the occurrence of the considered sce-
nario; it provides the value of the physical integrity, namely
yi=fi
(
ξ i
)
; when the external stress can be described by a
single scalar quantity ξi , the vulnerability function is rep-
resented by a non-increasing monotonic function with an
asymptotic behavior, since the physical integrity of an ele-
ment cannot drop below a certain value (that may coincide
with zero);
wi functionality; such a value represents the functionality
of each element when it is subject to the external stresses
corresponding to the considered scenario;
f
f
i (yi; wk, k ∈ P (i)) functional vulnerability function;
such a function expresses the functionality wi of element i
as a function of the physical integrity of this element, and of
the functionalities of the conditioning elements; note that the
conditioning elements must belong to the set R ∪ S.
Actually, the use of a generic term like “functionality” may
be too vague, as each element (or, better, each homogeneous
group of elements) is characterized by its own specific func-
tionality, which is not easily comparable with the functionali-
ties of other elements (or of other groups of elements). At the
same time, a detailed study, involving each possible kind of
functionality linked to the specific characteristics of the con-
sidered elements, could make unfeasible the resolution of the
problem, as regards both the dimensions and the complexity
of the vulnerability assessment model.
In the following, rather than generically referring to the
functionality of an element, two different indicators will be
used, depending on the sub-set the considered element be-
longs to:
ci criticality; this indicator is simply given by 1−wi , and
is used only in connection with nodes belonging to sub-set
D; it may assume values belonging to interval [0,1], where 1
corresponds to an element whose functionality is completely
zeroed, and 0 corresponds to an element whose functionality
is not affected at all within the considered scenario;
wi efficiency; this indicator coincides with the functional-
ity, and is used only in connection with elements belonging
to sub-set R ∪ S.
A possible structure for the functional vulnerability func-
tions for the elements of the territorial system is
wi = yi ·
∏
k∈P(i)
Zik (wk) i ∈ R ∪ S ∪D, (1)
where Zik (wk) is a function expressing the functional con-
ditioning of element k on element i given by
Zik (wk) = 1 − α
−1
ik e
−αikw2k
1 − α−1ik e−αik
i ∈ R∪S∪D k ∈ P (i) , (2)
where parameter αik is used to express the level of condition-
ing influence of element k with respect to element i. A pos-
sible way to evaluate such a parameter is reported in the fol-
lowing. The value of parameter αik is generally related to the
degree of sensitiveness of the functionality of element i with
respect to the functionality of element k. For instance, val-
ues 1, 1.5, 3, and 6 of parameter αik , may be used to indicate
a strong influence, a medium-strong influence, a medium-
weak influence and a weak influence, respectively. One can
note that, in any case, the value of the function Zik (wk) is
equal to 1 when the argument has value 1. This is consis-
tent with the meaning of this function, as no reduction in
the functionality of element i may be induced by element k,
when this element is fully functional.
Then, in correspondence to a given scenario, the vulnera-
bility analysis of a certain territorial system can be obtained
by the following procedure:
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1. solve the system of nonlinear Eqs. (1), (2), written only
for i∈R∪S, thus obtaining the efficiency of each ele-
ment i∈R∪S; this step requires the solution of a system
of non-linear equations, and then, in general, the use of
an iterative numerical procedure;
2. compute directly by
ci = 1 − yi ·
∏
k∈P (i)
Zik (wk) i ∈ D (3)
the criticality of each element in D (since the conditioning
elements may belong only to sub-set R ∪ S).
Possible ways can be devised to assess, in an objective
way (i.e., on the basis only of quantitative information re-
lated to the territorial elements under concern), the values of
the parameters appearing in functions (2). For instance, re-
ferring to the conditioning influence of a service center p of
category j (e.g., such a category may include all civil pro-
tection centers and headquarters) over a urban settlement r ,
let us consider the following parameters (that could be easily
found in a geo-referenced database):
Rj sub-set of centers of category j ;
Ep number of employees of center p, of category j ;
Ir number of inhabitants of urban settlement r;
drp distance between urban settlement r and center p.
Then, a possible simple way to express the level of influ-
ence of element p over element r is that of introducing an
un-normalized parameter α˜rp defined as
α˜rp = Ep
Ir
1∑
q∈Rj
Eq
e−0.5drp . (4)
This parameter is generally not expressed within a scale suit-
able for the utilization in Eq. (2), and thus it has to be re-
scaled, obtaining parameter αrp as follows
αrp = a
1 − α˜rp
max
s∈U,q∈Rj
{
α˜sq
}
 , (5)
where U is the set of urban elements over the considered
territory, and a is a scale factor. Expressions analogous to
Eqs. (4) and (5) can be introduced for all the categories of el-
ements that have to be taken into account in the vulnerability
analysis of the territorial system.
3 An optimal resource location problem
The results of the systemic vulnerability analysis can be ob-
viously used in order to deepen the knowledge of the territory
under consideration, and its response to a certain considered
scenario. The criticality values can be used in order to iden-
tify the elements that would be most heavily affected by the
phenomena occurring in the considered scenario, and thus
primarily require to devise suitable interventions to mitigate
hazard exposure, or to reduce the effects of the conditioning
by other elements. On the other side, the efficiency values
allow to evaluate the effectiveness of the elements involved
(either actively or passively) in the emergency management
phase.
A further application of the models and the concepts intro-
duced in the previous section is related to the possibility of
formalizing optimal (preventive) resource location problems,
as regards emergency management. Namely, mathematical
programming problems may be defined, having the objective
of distributing the (scarce) resources over the considered ter-
ritory, in order to protect such elements that, in connection
with a catastrophic natural event, may be characterized by
the highest criticality.
More specifically, given a set of available resources (for
the sake of simplicity, just one kind of resources is consid-
ered), the optimal location (assignment) of such resources to
the various service centers is considered within a completely
deterministic setting. The decision variables representing the
amount of resources assigned to the various service centers
are assumed to be continuous variables (i.e., the available
amount of resources is considered as continuously divisible).
This assumption is not completely acceptable whenever (as it
happens in most cases) the resources (e.g., men, means) are
discrete in nature. However, as the number of the available
resources is generally high, even in this case the (integer)
decision variables may be viewed as real ones in the formal-
ization of the optimization problems.
For the statement of the optimal resource location prob-
lem, the following definitions are necessary, in addition to
those provided in the previous section:
xi decisional continuous variable providing the number of
resources that are assigned to node i belonging to sub-set R;
X total amount of available resources;
eij contribution of the efficiency of element j to the cor-
rect functioning of element i. It corresponds to the value
assumed by function Zij
(
wj
)
in connection with the spe-
cific scenario; eij assumes values in the continuous interval
[0,1], where 1 indicates that the efficiency of j is not reduced
because of i, whereas 0 indicates that the reduced efficiency
ofj is making pointless the role of center i;
pl potential service demand associated to the generic node l
belonging to sub-set D; it represents a measure of the nec-
essary interventions (e.g., the number of persons requiring
transportation to a medical center).
Then, the following decision problem can be formalized,
as regards the assignment of the resources to the location
centers (e.g., headquarters), in order to minimize the max-
imum criticality over the considered area. The objective of
the problem is to assign resources to centers in order to miti-
gate the effects of the occurrence of a catastrophic event over
the whole area. In particular, the objective (to be minimized)
is the maximum criticality, over all elements in D, in con-
nection with the considered scenario, and under the selected
values of the resource location variables, xi , i∈ R.
The optimization problem is
min Z = max
i∈D
{ci} (6)
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s.t. the following constraints
ci = 1 − yi ·
∏
k∈P (i)
eik i ∈ D (7)
wi = yi ·
∏
k∈P (i)
eik i ∈ R ∪ S (8)
eij =
1 − α−1ij e−αijw
2
j
1 − α−1ij e−αij
i ∈ D ∪ R ∪ S j ∈ P (i) (9)
α˜ij = xj
pi
1
X
e−0.5dij i ∈ D j ∈ R, j ∈ P (i) (10)
αij=a

1 − α˜ij
max
s∈D
q∈R
q∈P (s)
{
α˜sq
}

i∈D j∈R, j∈P (i) (11)
∑
j∈R
xj = X (12)
xj ≥ 0 j ∈ R (13)
In the above problem statement, constraints (7) and (8) rep-
resent the expressions of the criticality and the efficiency of
the various elements. Constraints (9), (10) and (11) are anal-
ogous to (2), (4), (5). Note that constraints (10) are written in
order to express the influence of the resource assignments to
location centers over elements of the sub-set D. Note that in
the statement of the problem only the α˜ij (and the αij ) such
that i∈D, j∈R, j∈P (i) have to be considered as decision
variables, whereas the other ones (referring to other condi-
tioning influences) are considered as fixed, as they are not
affected by the considered resource location problem. The
physical integrities yi , for each element belonging to D, are
retained as given quantities, in the considered scenario. Con-
straints (11) are necessary for parameter scaling. Finally,
constraint (12) specifies the amount of resources globally
assignable.
It is worth noting that the above problem is just one among
the various possible problems that could be stated in connec-
tion with the above considered resource assignment frame-
work. For instance, one could consider, instead of the objec-
tive function in Eq. (6), another objective function expressing
the sum of the criticalities, for the various elements inD. The
meaning of the choice of this objective function is apparent:
instead of trying to reduce, as far as possible, the criticality of
the less favored element, this choice would attempt to reduce
the average criticality. Depending on the particular context,
the former or the latter choice (or even another one) may be
suitable.
It must be remarked that the optimization problem above
formulated is referred just to a given scenario (and to a given
type of hazard). On the other hand, the definition of the
location of resources at the various service centers should
take into account a multiplicity of scenarios. Such scenar-
ios should be considered along with their probabilities of oc-
currence, and possibly they could refer to different kinds of
natural hazards. However, the formulation of the optimal lo-
cation of resources taking into account a multiplicity of sce-
narios (each weighted by its probability of occurrence) can
be viewed as a generalization of the kind of problems intro-
duced in this section, and thus, for the sake of brevity, it is
omitted.
4 Application to a case study
The proposed approach has been applied to a case study rel-
evant to the hydrologic risk in the Vara catchment in Liguria
region, Italy. More precisely, some results are presented, rel-
evant to the application of the procedure for the analysis of
the systemic vulnerability in the Vara catchment area.
First, an analysis and a characterization of the territorial el-
ements in the Vara catchment relevant to the emergencies that
can arise from probable hydrologic hazardous events have
been performed. Then, the functional relationships among
these elements have been identified and quantitatively evalu-
ated.
Further, some significant hydrologic scenarios have been
selected, and the elements that might be directly involved in
such events have been identified. Finally, the vulnerability
analysis of the whole territorial system has been carried out,
following the procedure described in Sect. 2. In the follow-
ing, the sequence of such phases is described in detail.
4.1 Description of the territorial model relevant to the Vara
catchment
The Vara River is an affluent of the Magra River, one of the
seven catchments of inter-regional interest in Italy. The Vara
catchment lies in Liguria region, near the northwestern coast
of Italy, and it covers a territory of roughly 560 km2, for a
river length of about 60 km (see Fig. 1). The territory be-
longing to the Vara catchment is mainly mountainous, and
it is characterized by small and scattered urban centers, con-
centrated in the downstream area of the basin. The overall
population is about 30 000 inhabitants, without any signifi-
cant periodicity dependent on the season of the year.
A detailed analysis of the territory has allowed the defini-
tion of the directed graph representing the territorial system
of the Vara basin. The nodes of this graph are represented
by the main urban settlements, the stretches of the road net-
work, the medical centers, and the main operational centers
(policemen, firemen,. . . ) that play an active role in an emer-
gency management phase.
Urban settlements have been only taken into account when
directly affected by the phenomena characterizing the con-
sidered scenarios. Thus, as it is better explained in the fol-
lowing, just those elements that lie in the flood area relevant
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Fig. 1. The Vara basin and its localization within the Italian terri-
tory. The red line encompasses the basin, whereas the blue lines
identify the basin hydrography.
to a return time T=30, T=200, or T=500 (Rosso and Kotte-
goda, 1997) have been considered.
A simplified road network has been used, composed of
more than 80 elements. Such elements represent the main
infrastructures, and the main links among the urban centers.
Despite this simplification, in this way, it is possible to ade-
quately characterize the road network.
As regards sub-set R, 13 operational units and 8 health-
care units have been identified and considered for the vulner-
ability analysis.
The information relevant to the localization (where avail-
able) of the considered territorial elements has been superim-
posed on the map of the flood areas, for the different return
times, characterizing the river basin. In this context, two dif-
ferent scenarios have been considered, characterized by re-
turn times T=200 and T=500 years, respectively. In the first
one, referred in the following as “Scenario A”, 36 elements
belong to sub-set D. In the other one, referred in the follow-
ing as “Scenario B”, 40 elements belong to sub-set D. Thus,
the number of elements belonging to the sub-set D of nodes
directly involved in the scenario event is dependent on the
return time one refers to. Moreover, no operational unit or
health care unit belongs to sub-set D (neither in Scenario A
or in Scenario B).
Each element belonging to sub-set D has been character-
ized in terms of its loss of physical integrity, on the basis
of the information relevant to its inclusion, or not, into the
different flood areas.
More precisely, in Scenario A, if an element is located just
in the T=200 flood area, it has been assumed that such an el-
ement is characterized by a physical integrity loss of 50%. If
such an element is also located in the T=30 years flood area,
a loss of physical integrity equal to 75% has been assigned
to it.
Referring to Scenario B, if an element is only located in the
T=500 flood area, it has been assumed that such an element
is characterized by a physical integrity loss of 50%. If such
an element was located both in the T=200 and in the T=500
years flood area, a loss of physical integrity equal to 75% has
Fig. 2. Categories of nodes for which the influence evaluation has
been performed. A blue “V” means that the category of nodes on
the row has been considered as influenced by the category of nodes
on the corresponding column, whereas a red “X” means that such
an influence has not been taken into account.
been assigned to it. If, in addition, the element belonged to
the T=30 years flood area, it has been assumed that such an
element is characterized by a physical integrity loss of 85%.
Referring to the classification introduced in Sect. 2, it has
been necessary to identify the elements belonging to the sub-
sets R and S. Sub-set R is made by 21 headquarters, ambu-
latories and hospitals. Sub-set S is made by 81 stretches of
the simplified road network. The union of the three sub-sets
D, R and S is composed of 112 elements within scenario B.
Once the determination of the elements involved in the
analysis was carried out, the evaluation of the functional de-
pendencies among the nodes has been performed. Such an
evaluation has been only carried out for those couples of
node typologies for which both a conditioning node and a
conditioned node has been actually identified in the consid-
ered area. Figure 2 shows the influence evaluations that have
been carried out: a blue “V” in the table means that the cat-
egory of nodes on the row is influenced by the category of
nodes on the column, whereas a red “X” means that such an
influence does not exist.
The influences, evaluated through Eqs. (4) and (5), are as-
sociated to the links of the directed graph under considera-
tion. The overall influence structure (i.e., for each node i,
the predecessor nodes and the values of parameters αij ) is
reported in Appendix A.
4.2 Application of the proposed procedure
The vulnerability analysis of the territorial system has been
performed in connection with the two selected scenarios. In
the following, the primes “A” and “B” are used in order to
indicate parameters and variables referring to Scenarios A
and B, respectively.
The results that have been obtained by the application of
the procedure proposed in Sect. 2, in order to characterize the
elements belonging to sub-set D in terms of criticality, and
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Fig. 3. The municipalities of the Vara basin have been characterized
by the values of the most critical urban center belonging to such a
municipality in Scenario A. The flood area relevant to this scenario
(namely, the flood area characterized by T=200 years) is represented
in blue.
the elements belonging to the sub-sets R and S in terms of
efficiency.
In Scenario A, 37 elements result to be characterized by a
positive value of the quantity cAi −
(
1−yAi
) (namely, the crit-
icality increase, i.e. the difference among the criticality and
the complement to one of the physical integrity). Such an
increase is due to an indirect effect induced by the condition-
ing influences of other considered elements. The mean value
of the above quantities, over all such 37 elements, is equal to
0.02; the maximum value is equal to 0.19 (corresponding to a
urban settlement belonging to the Municipality of Brugnato).
Then, as the overall criticality assessment is interesting
for civil protection purposes, the most suitable administrative
level appears to be the municipality one. For this reason, it
seems reasonable to associate the highest value of criticality,
among the territorial elements – mainly urban settlements –
belonging to its area, to each municipality, as shown in Fig. 3
for Scenario A.
On the other hand, referring to the efficiency, it has been
noted that some elements are characterized by an efficiency
decrease, which is due to the direct effects of the scenario
phenomena. More specifically, 28 elements belonging to
sub-set S are characterized by such a decrease. The exis-
tence of functional dependences among the elements implies
a further decrease in the efficiencies for some elements be-
longing to sub-sets S and R. In fact, the mean value, over
such elements, of the physical integrities (evaluated without
taking into account the conditioning influences) is equal to
Fig. 4. Representation of the road network of the Vara basin, in
which each road link is characterized on the basis of the efficiency
obtained in connection to Scenario A. The flood area relevant to
this scenario (namely, the flood area characterized by T=200 years)
is represented in blue.
0.80, whereas the mean value over the same set of elements
of the efficiency (evaluated taking into account such influ-
ences) is equal to 0.76. Actually, the elements that are char-
acterized by the lowest values of efficiency could not corre-
spond to those elements for which the decrease of efficiency
(taking into account the conditioning influences by other ele-
ments) is highest. For instance, the lowest value of efficiency
can be found in connection to a road link belonging to the
municipality of Borghetto Vara (in the medium part of the
valley, in the proximity of the flood area relevant to T=200
years), whereas the highest value of efficiency decrease can
be found in connection to a road link in the municipality of
Varese Ligure (in the upriver area, directly connected to an-
other road heavily affected in the scenario event). Figure 4
represents the efficiencies corresponding to the road links in
Scenario A, whereas Fig. 5 represents the efficiency decrease
of the same elements, always in connection with Scenario A.
In Scenario B, 40 elements are characterized by a positive
value of the criticality increase, with a mean criticality de-
crease among such elements equal to 0.10. The maximum
value of the difference cBi −
(
1−yBi
)
is again related to the
Municipality of Brugnato, but in this case such a value is
equal to 0.48. Here again, the maximum value of such a dif-
ference does not correspond to the maximum value of the
criticality over the considered nodes, which can be found in
connection to the Municipality of Varese Ligure (here, the
criticality in Scenarios B is equal to 0.89). Finally, Fig. 6
shows the highest values of criticality characterizing each
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Fig. 5. Representation of the road network of the Vara basin, in
which each road link is characterized on the basis of the difference
between its physical integrity and the efficiency obtained in connec-
tion to Scenario A. The flood area relevant to this scenario (namely,
the flood area characterized by T=200 years) is represented in blue.
Fig. 6. The municipalities of the Vara basin have been characterized
by the values of the most critical urban center belonging to such a
municipality in Scenario B. The flood area relevant to this scenario
(namely, the flood area characterized by T=500 years) is represented
in blue.
Fig. 7. Representation of the road network of the Vara basin, in
which each road link is characterized on the basis of the efficiency
obtained in connection to Scenario B. The flood area relevant to
this scenario (namely, the flood area characterized by T=500 years)
is represented in blue.
Fig. 8. Representation of the road network of the Vara basin, in
which each road link is characterized on the basis of the difference
between its physical integrity and the efficiency obtained in connec-
tion to Scenario B. The flood area relevant to this scenario (namely,
the flood area characterized by T=500 years) is represented in blue.
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municipality in Scenario B.
As in the previous scenario, 28 elements belonging to sub-
set R are directly involved in the event, but now the physical
integrity values of such elements are lower, as well as the
mean physical integrity value over all the elements belonging
to sub-sets R and S (equal to 0.78). Also the mean efficiency
value is lower than in Scenarios A, and it is equal to 0.73.
Here again, the elements that are characterized by the lowest
efficiency and by the highest value of efficiency decrease do
not coincide. Such evaluations are summarized by Figs. 7
and 8, respectively.
A synthesis of the overall obtained results is reported in
Appendix A.
5 Conclusions and further research directions
This paper introduces a formal approach, based on a previ-
ous technique presented in Minciardi et al. (2005), for the
representation and the vulnerability analysis of a territorial
system when subject to extreme natural events corresponding
to given scenarios. The approach has been presented in order
to stress its conceptual independence from the particular area
considered, and, above all, from the kind of natural hazard.
A case study has also been discussed relevant to hydrogeo-
logical hazard in a basin located in North Italy. Despite sev-
eral simplifying assumptions regarding the resource charac-
terization, the modeling of conditioning influences, and the
representation of the territorial system, the paper provides
a conceptual framework within which analysis and decision
problems relevant to long-term planning can be posed.
Further research directions should regard essentially three
issues. The first one is related to the complexity of the model.
In fact, different categories of resources could be consid-
ered, and the ways to represent the conditioning influences
among the various territorial elements should be refined and
made more dependent (also in the structure) on the partic-
ular kind of the pair of elements. Second, as the problems
addressed refer to long-term planning, the use of statistical
information, and of a mathematical representation of the un-
certainties related to risk assessment, would make the analy-
sis procedures and the position of the resource location prob-
lems more sound. Finally, the management of an emergency
(corresponding to a certain scenario, represented taking into
account the dynamics of the event) should be viewed as a
dynamic problem. In this respect, the criticalities and the
efficiencies of the various elements should be evaluated as
dynamically evolving during the various phases of the event
and of the emergency management process.
Appendix A
Here the main characteristics of the case study are reported,
in order to allow the reader to understand its structure and the
complexity. Such elements are reported in Table A1.
More precisely, for each node i, the following information
is reported:
– the category to which the elements belong, namely S
(settlement), R (road links), or H (headquarter);
– the set of predecessor nodes j , characterized by the
level of influence αij ;
– the level of physical integrity in the two different sce-
narios, namely yAi and yBi ;
– the criticality of the element (if it belongs to sub-set D)
in the two Scenarios, namely cAi and c
B
i ;
– the efficiency of the element (if it belongs to sub-set R
or sub-set S) in the two Scenarios, namely wAi and w
B
i .
30 R. Minciardi et al.: Complex territorial systems subject to natural hazards
Table A1. For each considered element/node, the category, the set of predecessor nodes (characterized by the level of influence αij ), and the
main results obtained in connection to Scenarios A and B are reported.
Node i Node type Predecessor node j (along with value αij ) yAi yBi cAi cBi wAi wBi
1 S 28(1.5),92(6.28),93(6.95),94(6.97),95(7.72),96(8.73),97(9.03),98(7.92), 1 0.9 – 0.17 – –
100(7.92),101(8.22),102(8.79),103(8.74),104(9.28),105(9.41),109(1.5),
110(9.93),111(10),112(10)
2 S 33(1.5),92(9.95),93(9.95),94(9.96),95(9.93),96(9.97),97(9.98),98(9.95), 0.25 0.15 0.76 0.86 – –
100(9.95),101(9.96),102(9.97),103(9.97),104(9.98),105(9.95),109(9.83),
110(10),111(10),112(10)
3 S 25(1.5),92(9.7),93(9.7),94(9.74),95(9.66),96(9.84),97(9.88),98(9.74),100(9.74),101(9.77), 0.25 0.15 0.76 0.86 – –
102(9.83),103(9.84),104(9.91),105(9.68),109(8.54),110(10), 111(10),112(10)
4 S 57(1.5),92(9.86),93(9.85),94(9.88),95(9.83),96(9.89),97(9.92),98(9.83), 100(9.83),101(9.85), 0.25 0.15 0.76 0.86 – –
102(9.88),103(9.9),104(9.94),105(9.82),109(9.93), 110(10),111(10),112(10)
5 S 26(1.5),92(8.94),93(8.97),94(9.07),95(9.36),96(9.58),97(9.68),98(9.33), 100(9.33),101(9.42), 1 0.9 – 0.17 – –
102(9.61),103(9.59),104(9.76),105(9.68),109(9.35), 110(9.91),111(10),112(10)
6 S 92(9.71),93(9.61),94(9.75),95(9.76),96(9.73),97(9.79),98(9.6),100(9.6), 101(9.66),102(9.77), 0.75 0.65 0.5 0.36 – –
103(9.73),104(9.85),105(9.88),109(9.99),110(9.96), 111(10),112(10)
7 S 40(7.88),42(7.88),53(7.88),54(7.88),92(9.97),93(9.96),94(9.97),95(9.97), 96(9.97),97(9.97),98(9.94), 0.75 0.5 0.44 0.73 – –
100(9.94),101(9.95),102(9.97),103(9.97),104(9.98),105(9.98), 109(10),110(10),111(10),112(10)
8 S 54(1.5),92(9.9),93(9.87),94(9.91),95(9.9),96(9.9),97(9.92),98(9.84),100(9.84),101(9.86),102(9.9), 0.25 0.15 0.76 0.86 – –
103(9.9),104(9.94),105(9.91),109(9.99),110(10),111(10), 112(10)
9 S 56(1.5) 1 0.9 – 0.16 – –
10 S 59(7.17),61(7.17),62(7.17),92(9.95),93(9.94),94(9.96),95(9.96),96(9.9), 97(9.93),98(9.92), 0.25 0.15 0.78 0.88 – –
100(9.92),101(9.93),102(9.93),103(9.91),104(9.95),105(10),109(10),110(10),111(10),112(10)
11 S 52(1.5),92(9.36),93(9.13),94(9.44),95(9.39),96(9.1),97(9.32),98(8.89), 100(8.89),101(9.04), 0.75 0.65 0.5 0.36 – –
102(9.19),103(9.11),104(9.5),105(9.9),109(9.99), 110(9.99),111(10),112(10)
12 S 63(8.3),64(8.3),65(8.3),66(8.3),72(8.3),92(9.98),93(9.98),94(9.99),95(9.99), 96(9.97), 0.25 0.15 0.8 0.89 – –
97(9.95),98(9.98),100(9.98),101(9.98),102(9.98),103(9.97), 104(9.96),105(10),
109(10), 110(10),111(10),112(10)
13 R 16(7.88),17(7.88),18(7.88),19(7.88) 1 1 – – 0.88 0.83
14 R 24(5.75),26(5.75) 1 1 – – 0.95 0.92
15 R 28(7.17),29(7.17),30(7.17),92(9.98),93(9.98),94(9.98),95(9.98),96(9.06), 97(9.84),98(10), 0.25 0.15 0.78 0.88 0.22 0.12
99(8.13),100(9.71),101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
16 R 13(5.75),28(5.75),92(9.99),93(9.99),94(9.99),95(9.99),96(7.1),97(9.76),98(10),99(7.17), 0.25 0.15 0.77 0.86 0.23 0.14
100(9.9),101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
17 R 1 1 – – 1 1
18 R 17(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
19 R 13(5.75),18(5.75),92(9.99),93(9.99),94(9.99),95(9.99),96(6.7),97(9.86), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
98(10),99(8.53), 100(9.94),101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
20 R 21(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
21 R 20(5.75),22(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
22 R 21(5.75),39(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
23 R 22(5.75),27(5.75) 1 1 – – 0.94 0.92
24 R 14(5.75),27(5.75) 1 1 – – 0.94 0.92
25 R 33(5.75),35(5.75),92(9.91),93(9.91),94(9.91),95(9.93),96(9.92),97(9.93), 98(10),99(9.73), 0.25 0.15 0.76 0.86 0.24 0.14
100(6.1),101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
26 R 14(5.75),27(5.75),92(9.95),93(9.95),94(9.95),95(9.96),96(8.11),97(9.03), 98(10),99(4.14), 0.25 0.15 0.77 0.86 0.23 0.14
100(9.89),101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
27 R 23(7.88),24(7.88),26(7.88),28(7.88),92(9.82),93(9.82),94(9.82),95(9.85), 0.25 0.15 0.79 0.88 0.21 0.12
96(9.59),97(9.18),98(10),99(8.37),100(9.63),101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
28 R 15(7.17),26(7.17),27(7.17),92(9.98),93(9.98),94(9.98),95(9.98),96(8.28), 97(9.75),98(10), 0.25 0.15 0.8 0.89 0.2 0.11
99(6.86),100(9.83),101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
29 R 30(1.5),92(9.97),93(9.97),94(9.97),95(9.97),96(9.47),97(9.86),98(10),99(8.67),100(9.47), 0.75 0.65 0.37 0.40 0.63 0.6
101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
30 R 29(1.5),92(9.98),93(9.98),94(9.98),95(9.98),96(9.76),97(9.94),98(10),99(9.48),100(9.29), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
31 R 32(1.5) 1 1 – 1 1
32 R 31(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
33 R 25(1.5),92(9.92),93(9.92),94(9.92),95(9.93),96(9.96),97(9.96),98(10),99(9.88),100(2.33), 0.25 0.15 0.76 0.86 0.24 0.14
101(10),102(10),103(10),104(10)
34 R 1 1 – – 1 1
35 R 25(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.94
36 R 39(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
37 R 38(5.75),39(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
38 R 37(5.75),39(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
39 R 37(5.75),38(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
40 R 49(5.75),65(5.75),92(1.5),93(1.5),94(1.5),95(2.71),96(9.99),97(9.85),98(9.87),99(9.97), 0.25 0.15 0.78 0.88 0.22 0.12
100(9.93),101(9.8),102(9.79),103(10),104(10)
41 R 1 1 – – 1 1
42 R 92(8.45),93(8.45),94(8.45),95(8.67),96(9.95),97(9.62),98(9.97),99(9.82), 100(9.68), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
101(9.97),102(9.97),103(10),104(10)
43 R 44(5.75),45(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
44 R 43(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
45 R 43(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
46 R 47(5.75),48(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
47 R 46(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
48 R 46(5.75),51(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
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Table A1. Continued.
Node i Node type Predecessor node j (along with value αij ) yAi yBi cAi cBi wAi wBi
49 R 40(7.88),53(7.88),56(7.88),65(7.88),92(8.49),93(8.49),94(8.49),95(8.71), 0.25 0.15 0.81 0.9 0.19 0.1
96(10),97(9.98),98(9.1),99(10),100(9.98),101(9.24),102(9.22),103(10),104(10)
50 R 1 1 – – 1 1
51 R 48(5.75),52(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
52 R 51(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
53 R 49(7.17),54(7.17),56(7.17) 0.25 0.15 0.8 0.89 0.2 0.11
54 R 53(5.75),57(5.75) 0.25 0.15 0.78 0.87 0.22 0.13
55 R 57(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.94
56 R 49(5.75),53(5.75),92(9.17),93(9.17),94(9.17),95(9.29),96(10),97(9.99), 0.25 0.15 0.78 0.88 0.22 0.12
98(8.28),99(10), 100(9.98),101(9.6),102(9.59),103(10),104(10)
57 R 54(5.75),55(5.75),92(9.22),93(9.22),94(9.22),95(9.33),96(9.99),97(9.96), 0.25 0.15 0.77 0.86 0.23 0.14
98(9.93),99(9.96),100(9.39),101(9.98),102(9.98),103(10),104(10)
58 R 1 1 – – 1 1
59 R 63(5.75),82(5.75),92(9.96),93(9.96),94(9.96),95(9.97),96(10),97(10),98(9.75), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
99(10), 100(10),101(8.94),102(8.91),103(9.78),104(9.83)
60 R 61(1.5),92(9.88),93(9.88),94(9.88),95(9.89),96(10),97(10),98(8.5), 0.75 0.65 0.37 0.4 0.63 0.6
99(10), 100(10), 101(8.67),102(8.63),103(9.96),104(9.97)
61 R 60(1.5),92(9.69),93(9.69),94(9.69),95(9.74),96(10),97(9.99),98(9.28), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
99(10), 100(10), 101(5.79),102(5.67),103(9.97),104(9.98)
62 R 63(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
63 R 59(7.17),62(7.17),72(7.17) 1 1 – – 0.89 0.84
64 R 65(7.17),84(7.17),86(7.17),92(10),93(10),94(10),95(10), 0.25 0.15 0.77 0.87 0.23 0.13
96(10),97(10),98(10), 99(10), 100(10),101(9.99),102(9.99),103(5.64),104(6.64)
65 R 64(1.5),92(10),93(10),94(10),95(10),96(10),97(10), 0.25 0.15 0.76 0.86 0.24 0.14
98(10),99(10),100(10), 101(9.99), 102(9.99),103(5.59),104(6.6)
66 R 67(5.75),85(5.75) 1 1 – – 0.95 0.92
67 R 66(5.75),69(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
68 R 1 1 – – 1 1
69 R 67(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
70 R 88(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
71 R 92(10),93(10),94(10),95(10),96(10),97(10),98(9.99), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
99(10),100(10),101(9.97),102(9.97), 103(1.5),104(3.45)
72 R 73(1.5),92(10),93(10),94(10),95(10),96(10),97(10), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
98(9.99),99(10),100(10), 101(9.95), 102(9.95),103(4.77),104(5.97)
73 R 72(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.94
74 R 76(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.94
75 R 1 1 – – 1 1
76 R 74(1.5),92(10),93(10),94(10),95(10),96(10),97(10), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
98(9.97),99(10),100(10), 101(9.89), 102(9.89),103(8.2),104(8.61)
77 R 92(9.99),93(9.99),94(9.99),95(10),96(10),97(10),98(9.9),99(10), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
78 R 89(5.75),91(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
100(10), 101(9.87), 102(9.86),103(9.57),104(9.67)
79 R 80(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.94
80 R 79(5.75),81(5.75),92(9.98),93(9.98),94(9.98),95(9.98),96(10),97(10),98(9.4), 0.25 0.15 0.75 0.85 0.25 0.15
99(10), 100(10),101(9.75),102(9.74),103(9.93),104(9.94)
81 R 80(5.75),82(5.75) 1 1 – – 0.95 0.92
82 R 81(5.75),91(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
83 R 85(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.94
84 R 64(7.88),85(7.88),86(7.88),87(7.88) 1 1 – – 0.87 0.82
85 R 64(7.17),84(7.17),86(7.17),92(10),93(10),94(10),95(10),96(10), 0.25 0.15 0.77 0.87 0.23 0.13
97(10),98(10), 99(10), 100(10),101(10),102(9.99),103(9.16),104(9.35)
86 R 64(7.17),84(7.17),85(7.17) 1 1 – – 0.88 0.83
87 R 1 1 – – 1 1
88 R 1 1 – – 1 1
89 R 78(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
90 R 1 1 – – 1 1
91 R 78(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
92 H 13(5.75),18(5.75) 1 1 – – 1 1
93 H 23(1.5) 1 1 – – 1 1
94 H 16(5.75),28(5.75) 1 1 – – 0.88 0.84
95 H 33(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.94
96 H 59(7.17),61(7.17),62(7.17) 1 1 – – 0.89 0.84
97 H 63(8.3),64(8.3),65(8.3),66(8.3),72(8.3) 1 1 – – 0.81 0.74
98 H 40(7.88),42(7.88),53(7.88),54(7.88) 1 1 – – 0.75 0.67
99 H 40(7.88),42(7.88),53(7.88),54(7.88) 1 1 – – 0.75 0.67
100 H 40(7.88),42(7.88),53(7.88),54(7.88) 1 1 – – 0.75 0.67
101 H 40(7.88),42(7.88),53(7.88),54(7.88) 1 1 – – 0.75 0.67
102 H 49(5.75),53(5.75) 1 1 – – 0.87 0.84
103 H 59(7.17),61(7.17),62(7.17) 1 1 – – 0.89 0.84
104 H 63(8.3),64(8.3),65(8.3),66(8.3),72(8.3) 1 1 – – 0.81 0.74
105 H 27(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.93
106 H 40(7.88),42(7.88),53(7.88),54(7.88) 1 1 – – 0.75 0.67
107 H 33(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.94
108 H 1 1 – – 1 1
109 H 25(1.5) 1 1 – – 0.96 0.94
110 H 1 1 – – 1 1
111 H 1 1 – – 1 1
112 H 1 1 – – 1 1
32 R. Minciardi et al.: Complex territorial systems subject to natural hazards
Acknowledgements. This work has been partially funded by
European Union, by Regione Liguria, and by Provincia della
Spezia under the Interreg III B Program – Alpine Space CatchRisk
Project.
Edited by: T. Glade
Reviewed by: S. Fuchs and K. Hollenstein
References
Balducelli, C. and D’Esposito, C.: Genetic agents in an EDSS sys-
tem to optimize resources management and risk object evacua-
tion, Safety Science, 35, 59–73, 2000.
Bogardi, J. J.: Hazards, risks and vulnerabilities in a changing envi-
ronment: the unexpected onslaught on human security?, Global
Environmental Change, 14, 361–365, 2004.
Cutter, S. L.: Vulnerability to environmental hazards, Progress in
Human Geography, 20, 529–539, 1996.
Fabiano, B., Curro`, F., Palazzi, E., and Pastorino, R.: A framework
for risk assessment and decision-making strategies in dangerous
good transportation, J. Hazard. Mater., 93, 1–15, 2002.
Fiorucci, P., Gaetani, F., Minciardi, R., and Trasforini, E.: Natu-
ral risk assessment and decision planning for disaster mitigation,
Advances in Geosciences, 2, 161–165, 2005,
SRef-ID: 1680-7359/adgeo/2005-2-161.
Giglio, D., Minciardi, R., Pizzorni, D., Rudari, R., Sacile, R., Toma-
soni, A., and Trasforini, E.: A decision support system for real
time risk assessment of hazardous material transport on road,
Transactions of the 2nd Biennial Meeting of the International En-
vironmental Modelling and Software Society iEMSs 2004, Os-
nabreuck, 14–17 June 2004, Manno, Switzerland, 2004.
Howard, R. A. and Matheson, J. E.: The principles and applications
of decision analysis, Strategic Decisions Group, Palo Alto, CA,
1984.
Horritt, M. S. and Bates, P. D.: Evaluation of 1D and 2D numerical
models for predicting river inundation, J. Hydrol., 268, 87–99,
2002.
Kottegoda, N. T. and Rosso, R.: Statistic, probability, and relia-
bility for civil and environmental engineers, The McGraw-Hill
Companies, Inc., Singapore, 1997.
Krzysztofowicz, R.: The case for probabilistic forecasting in hy-
drology, J. Hydrol., 249, 2–9, 2001.
Lavell, A.: An Approach to Concept and Definition in Risk man-
agement Terminology and Practice, October 2000, Northum-
bria University, Internal Report available at http://online.
northumbria.ac.uk/, 2000.
Minciardi, R., Sacile, R., Taramasso, A. C., Trasforini, E., and
Traverso, S.: Modeling the vulnerability of complex territorial
systems: An application to hydrological risk, Environmental
Modelling and Software, in press, 2005.
Schachter, R.: Probabilistic Inference and Influence Diagrams, Op-
erations Research, 36, 589–604, 1988.
Shenoy, P.: Valuation-Based systems for Bayesian Decision Analy-
sis, Operations Research, 40, 463–484, 1992.
Siccardi, F., Boni, G., Ferraris, L., and Rudari, R.: A hydro-
meteorological approach for Probabilistic Flood Forecast, J.
Geophys. Res., 110, D05101, doi:10.1029/2004JD005314, 2005.
Varnes, D.: Landslide hazard zonation: a review of principles and
practice, Paris, UNESCO, 1984.
Wybo, J. L., Guarnie´ri, F., and Richard, B.: Forest fire danger as-
sessment methods and decision support, Safety Science, 20, 61–
70, 1995.
